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SERVICE OF PROCESS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA IN MISSISSIPPI
Anna Claire Henderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Now and then an extraordinary case may turn up, but
constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some
chances, and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will be
done.”1 Rather than being an extraordinary case, it is relatively common
to have a case where the location of a defendant, nonresident or resident
of the state, is unknown and service proves to be more difficult.2 With the
Supreme Court setting the standard for the constitutionality of notice in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Co.,3 courts have been given more
freedom to accept newly-proposed methods of service that would meet the
constitutional requirements,4 provided that the method is accepted and
proscribed by statute.5 With advances in technology, internet, and 81% of
the United States population being active on some form of a social media
account,6 it is evident that Americans are in a different era where service
by “notice on a courthouse door or in a newspaper” by publication are no
longer the most pragmatic means to notify a defendant who cannot be
located to be served process.7
For example, in Noble v. Noble, the wife attempted to serve her
husband in a divorce action through notice by “nonresident publication in
* J.D., Class of 2020, Mississippi College School of Law. Thank you to Law
Review at Mississippi College School of Law for editing and presenting this work,
“Service of Process Through Social Media in Mississippi,” in Spring 2020. This author
would also like to thank Dean Deborah Challener for her guidance in choosing the topic,
advising, and editing throughout the drafting process.
1. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950)
(citing Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911)).
2. See generally Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317 (Miss. 1987).
3. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
4. See Trisha Dowerah Baruah, Effectiveness of Social Media as a tool of
communication and its potential for technology enabled connections: A micro-level
study, 2 INT’L J. OF SCI. & RES. PUBL’NS 1, 8-9 (2012) (discussing the impact of
social media on the way people communicate and process information).
5. Noble, 502 So. 2d at 319.
6. J. Clement, Social Media – Statistics & Facts,
https://www.statista.com/topics/1164/social-networks/.
7. Peter S. Vogel & Sara Ann Brown, U.S. Trial Courts Now Allow Service
by Facebook and LinkedIn, but Will Appellate Courts Agree?, Soc. Media L. & P. Rep.
(BNA) 03 SMLR 33, at 789 (Nov. 4, 2014).
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[a] newspaper.”8 Due to the defendant not being found after a diligent
inquiry and “the post office address of the defendant [not being] known to
the plaintiff after diligent inquiry,” service of process by publication was a
constitutionally permissible method of effecting service upon the
defendant under Rule 4(c)(4)9 of Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Miss. R. Civ. P.”) to grant a divorce.10 However, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that service by publication was not an adequate form of
notice for rendering a “monetary judgment” with the granted divorce.11
The Court concluded that the adequacy of notice was questionable due to
the absence of some form of proof of the defendant’s receipt of the
summons.12 If social media service was allowed under Rule 4(c) as
another alternative procedural means, then locating and proving the
defendant’s reception of the summons would become less taxing.
With advances in communication and technology, it seems that
service through social media under the right circumstances could be “a
more pragmatic means by which to serve a missing defendant” than notice
by publication.13 If Mississippi would adopt a provision giving courts the
freedom to accept service through social media under certain
circumstances, it would possibly help alleviate some of the conflicts that
come with serving defendants who cannot be located or who are evading
service.
8. Noble, 502 So. 2d at 317.
9. Rule 4(c)(4) states:
(A) If the defendant in any proceeding in a chancery court, or
in any proceeding in any other court where process by
publication is authorized by statute, be shown by sworn
complaint or sworn petition, or by a filed affidavit, to be a
nonresident of this state or not to be found therein on diligent
inquiry and the post office address of such defendant be stated
in the complaint, petition, or affidavit, or if it be stated in such
sworn complaint or petition that the post office address of the
defendant is not known to the plaintiff or petitioner after
diligent inquiry, or if the affidavit be made by another for the
plaintiff or petitioner, that such post office address is
unknown to the affiant after diligent inquiry and he believes it
is unknown to the plaintiff or petitioner after diligent inquiry
by the plaintiff or petitioner, the clerk, upon filing the
complaint or petition, account or other commencement of a
proceeding, shall promptly prepare and publish a summons to
the defendant to appear and defend the suit. The summons
shall be substantially in the form set forth in Form 1-C.
10. Noble, 502 So. 2d at 321.
11. Id. at 320.
12. Id.
13. Vogel & Brown, supra note 7, at 789.
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This Article exposes a possible solution to the continuing problem
of serving defendants who are missing or evading service in Mississippi.
For a new method of service to be introduced, it has to meet the notice
requirements set out in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
and be authorized by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4.
This Article proposes an amendment to Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of
Civil Procedure that would give courts the power to allow alternative
forms of service, such as service via social media under certain
circumstances. In addition, this Article outlines the requirements that
social media service must meet to successfully be considered
constitutionally sufficient. This Article is not proposing that service of
process through social media replace all preexisting methods; rather, this
Article is simply introducing an alternative method to choose from that
would be more likely to provide defendants with notice under certain
circumstances.
II. THE HISTORY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “a person shall not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”14 A
cause of action is a form of property that is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution because one has a property interest in the
lawsuit.15 Under the Due Process Clause, if a court intends to interfere
with a person’s life, liberty, or property, a defendant must be given “the
opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly judged, and
therefore some form of hearing is required before the owner is finally
deprived of a protected property interest.”16
In order for a defendant’s due process right to be protected, “due
process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstance, to
appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action.”17 The purpose
of notice is to make a defendant aware of a pending action, so they have
the opportunity to be heard. Service of process is used to accomplish this
notice. The method used to notify a defendant of a lawsuit must always be
constitutional and comply with the applicable state or federal service rules
of that jurisdiction.18
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. Albert v. Allied Glove Corp., 944 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 2006) (citing Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)).
16. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
17. Miss. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Geotes, 770 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss. 2000).
18. Alyssa L. Eisenberg, Comment, Keep Your Facebook Friends Close and
Your Process Server Closer: The Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases
Involving Domestic Defendants, 51 San Diego L. Rev. 779, 782 (2014).
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The sections that follow explore what the standard is for
determining the constitutionality of different methods of services, as well
as how this standard developed. The sections will also address the
possible methods of service of process that meet this constitutional
standard, and that can be used to provide this important constitutional
right of notice. In addition, the sections will also explore how these
methods have evolved over the years due to progress in travel,
communications, and technological advances. Further, the following
sections will explore the evolution of service of process through social
media being used abroad19 and now in certain parts of the United States.20
A. Basic Purpose for Service of Process
The opportunity to be heard is the fundamental requisite for due
process of law that gives rise to the requirement of notice because the
right to be heard is worthless unless one is aware that an action is
pending,21 as well as a need for one to protect their rights to life, liberty,
and property.22 The basic purpose of service of process is to formally
assert the court’s authority over the defendant, as well as inform them of
the pending cause of action so that he or she can prepare to defend it.23
For a court to enter a binding judgment against a defendant, the defendant
must be given sufficient notice of the court’s intentions to interfere with
his liberty or property.24 Service of process is delivering the initial papers
in the action to the defendant to provide sufficient notice of a pending
action, so the defendant has the right to decide whether to appear, default,
acquiesce, or contest.25
For notice to be considered sufficient, the method of service
should be authorized by statutory provisions of that jurisdiction and must
19. See generally St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, No. 3:16-cv-3240LB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136152 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2016). Al-Ajmi was a Kuwaiti
national and efforts to locate him were unsuccessful. St. Francis asked to serve al-Ajmi
by alternative means under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) via the social-media
platform, Twitter.
20. See generally Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2015)
(Plaintiff wife was permitted to serve defendant husband a divorce summons by sending
a private message through defendant's social media account.).
21. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. JOSEPH W. GLANNON ET AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK (3d ed.
2017).
24. GLANNON ET AL, supra note 23, at 328; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
732-33 (1877).
25. GLANNON ET AL, supra note 23, at 328; Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-33.
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be constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.26
If the method of service of process is not proper due to being
unconstitutional or failing to comply with the rules of that jurisdiction,
then the court can dismiss the action or reverse the default judgment.27
Each state is allowed to determine what manners of service of process are
sufficient to assert that court’s authority over a defendant, but all methods
of service must comply with the requirements set out in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.28 For these
methods of service of process permitted by states to comply with this due
process law,29 they have to, at a minimum, meet the following
requirements: (1) notice and (2) opportunity for hearing appropriate for
the nature of the case.30
B. The Determination of a Method’s Constitutionality
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Supreme
Court expanded the basic constitutional standard for proper notice under
the Fourteenth Amendment, which became known as the “Mullane
Standard.”31 This case developed the determination of sufficient service
of process to be through notice that was “reasonably calculated to inform”
based on the circumstance of the individual case.32 For notice to be
sufficient under the Constitution, it must be “reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,” as well
as afford the interested parties a reasonable amount of time to make their
appearance.33 Even though “personal service of written notice within the
jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of
proceeding,”34 it is not always required under the circumstances of certain
cases.35 Actual notice is not constitutionally required,36 so constructive

26 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311.
27 Rentz v. Swift Transp. Co., 185 F.R.D. 693, 697 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
28 Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Service of Process Via Computer or Fax,
30 A.L.R.6th 413 (2008).
29 GLANNON ET AL, supra note 23, at 333.
30 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
31 Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Postman Never Rings Twice: The
Constitutionality of Service of Process by Posting After Green v. Lindsey, 33 Am. U.L.
Rev. 601 (1984).
32 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
33 Id. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).
34 Id. at 313.
35 Id. at 319.
36 Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 169-170 (2002).
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forms of notice, also referred to as substitute service, are allowed as long
as these methods are constitutional under the Mullane Standard.37
In Mullane, even though notice by publication in a newspaper to
beneficiaries of a trust was considered a sufficient statutory notice, it was
not considered the most practicable notice for beneficiaries whose names
and addresses were available.38 In this case, it was argued that statutory
notice by newspaper publication was sufficient for beneficiaries whose
“whereabouts could not with due diligence be ascertained.”39 But, “the
statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it
fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not
reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by
other means.”40 It was inadequate because it was not the most appropriate
or “reasonably calculated” method of service to inform the interested
parties who “were known present beneficiaries of known place of
residence.”41
Reasonableness is the key to the constitutional validity of notice.
Therefore, it is not a “mere gesture,” but the actual “means employed
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee” that is
necessary.42 Any statutory method of notice will be able to claim
constitutional validity if the method chosen is reasonably certain to inform
interested parties, and the form chosen is not substantially less likely to
provide notice than other feasible and customary substitutes.”43 With the
names and postal addresses of the beneficiaries being accessible, notice by
newspaper publication was less likely than postal notification to appraise
the beneficiaries of the pendency of the action.44
Thus, it is clear that when it is reasonably possible or practicable
to use a substitute method which would give more adequate warning to
interested parties than another, then one must always choose the method
that would appear truly desirous to inform the interested parties.45 In
cases where defendants are missing or unknown, however, “employment
of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that
the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree

37 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.
38. Id. at 318-19.
39. Id. at 317.
40. Id. at 319.
41. Id. at 313.
42. Id. at 315 (citing Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927)).
43. Id. (citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928)).
44. Id. at 318.
45. Id. at 317.
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foreclosing their rights.”46 The court has to look at the circumstances of
the case to determine whether the interested parties could have been easily
informed by another means of service, and if so, then the method chosen
will likely be determined inadequate or insufficient to satisfy the due
process of law.47
C. Service of Process in Mississippi and Federal Courts
Service of process for the purpose of this article refers to the
delivery of both the summons and a copy of the complaint together to the
interested party by someone that is at least eighteen and is not a party to
the action, which both Mississippi Rule 4 and Federal Rule 4 require.48
The plaintiff is free to request the court to order the service of the initial
papers of the lawsuit to be delivered by a U.S. Marshal or another
specially appointed person.49 In federal court, plaintiffs have to serve
defendants within 90 days of the filed complaint, whereas plaintiffs have
120 days to serve in Mississippi state courts.50 This is an example of how,
even though methods and procedures of services may vary to some extent
across jurisdictions, there are a set of traditional and basic methods that
are shared by Mississippi and federal courts, as well as other jurisdictions.
When a defendant cannot be located to the extent that it would
hinder the preferred in-hand service process or burden the plaintiff, the
court has alternative methods of service in place for the particular
situation to give defendants constructive notice, which is referred to as
“substitute service.”51 A variety of methods for substitute service of
process are described below that are authorized by certain jurisdictions
that “may be sufficient to inform parties of the object of proceedings.”52
Forms of substitute service vary throughout different jurisdictions, but
they all have the same goal and purpose of giving the defendant a
reasonable opportunity to have notice of the proceedings.53 Now that it
has been established what is to be delivered and who is to deliver the
summons and complaint, we will now discuss the different methods of
serving the papers to interested parties. The following sections will
46. Id. (citing Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905); Blinn v.
Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911)); See Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912)).
47. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-19.
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c); MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(h).
51. Substitute Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
52. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 728 (1877).
53. Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill, The Free Dictionary, FARLEX,
https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Service+of+Process (2005).
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address and compare some of these more traditional methods and also
discuss other evolving methods that Mississippi should adopt, such as
social media service.
D. Service of Process Through Social Media was First Introduced
Internationally
Neither Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4 or Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4 explicitly allow service of process
through social media, but it has been authorized under Rule 4(f) in federal
court and flexible notice provisions in other states. Rule 4(f) is the rule for
serving an individual in a foreign country.54 The foreign individual that is
to be served must be a competent person that is not a minor.55 The foreign
defendant must be served in one of the following manners: 1) “by an
internationally agreed means of service” authorized by the Hague
Convention, 2) “if there is no internationally agreed means,” then by
service authorized by the foreign country’s law, service directed by the
foreign country’s court upon request, personal service, or service by
certified mail, or 3) service by other means that are ordered by the court
that are not prohibited by an international agreement.56
The method of service of process via social media, such as “modes
of electronic and online communications including email and social
networking sites like Facebook,” was first introduced under Rule 4(f)(3).57
In federal court, Rule 4(f)(3) is the rule that governs service of process of
an individual in a foreign country that allows a method that is reasonably
calculated to give notice “by other means not prohibited by international
agreement, as the court orders,” leaving the proposed method of service
up to the court to authorize as proper and constitutional.58 This rule gives
rise to a catch-all provision that allows courts to authorize any means of
service as long as it complies with due process.59
The due process reasonableness inquiry standard set out in
Mullane60 “unshackles the federal courts from anachronistic methods of
service and permits them entry into the technological renaissance.”61
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f).
56. Id.
57. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22084, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014).
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
59. St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, No. 3:16-cv-3240-LB, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 136152 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2016).
60. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
61. Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Courts can order any means of service under this rule as long as the
method is reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the
proceedings and must not be prohibited by international agreement.62 The
international agreement does not have to explicitly authorize the proposed
method of service; it just cannot prohibit it.63 The international agreement
can simply be silent to the issue, which would allow courts to exercise
their unfettered authority to choose an alternative mode of service, such as
service by telex message,64 to be proper under the circumstances, like seen
in New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co.65 Service via social media is not a “last resort nor
extraordinary relief”66 method of service; it is merely one method of many
that is used to serve process on an international defendant.67 A plaintiff is
not required to attempt service through all other available means of
service offered under Rule 4(f) provision before resorting to requesting
social media service.68 The plaintiff simply has to show that social media
service is reasonably calculated to reach the defendant under the
circumstances of the case.
Under Rule 4(f)(3), the court is allowed to tailor the method of
service employed on an international defendant based on the specific
circumstances of the case.69 For example, in FTC v. PCCare Inc., the
plaintiff was proposing to serve the defendants that were located in India
via email and Facebook for unpaid attorney fees.70 Even though some
courts may require a show of attempted service through the other possible
methods, “Rule 4(f)(3) may allow the district court to order a special
method of service, even if other methods remain incomplete or

62. WhosHere, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22084, at *7.
63. New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
64. The telex is an older “system of communication in which messages are
sent over long distances by using a telephone system and are printed by using a special
machine (called a teletypewriter).” Telex, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2015).
65. New England Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 495 F. Supp. at 81.
66. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016.
67. Id. at 1015.
68. FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1014-15 (“No such requirement is
found in the Rule's text, implied by its structure, or even hinted at in the advisory
committee notes,” “that Rule 4(f) should be read to create a hierarchy of preferred
methods of service of process.”).
69. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22084, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014) (citing SEC v. Anticevtic, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11480, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2009)).
70. PCCare247 Inc., 2013 WL 841037, at *5.
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unattempted.”71 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) proposed
service by email, social networking site (Facebook), and publication,
which publication was set as a last resort due to cost.72 The court found
that service via email and Facebook as a “backstop” did not violate any
international agreement, nor did they violate due process.73
In PCCare Inc., service by email alone was held to comply with
“due process [if] a plaintiff demonstrates that the email is likely to reach
the [foreign] defendant.”74 The plaintiff demonstrated the authenticity of
the email by establishing that the email accounts it had for the foreign
defendants had been an effective means of communicating with the
defendants, which was the case here because it was an internet-based
business that communicated through email.75 However, Facebook was not
able to stand alone as the sole method of service, but rather a
reinforcement to service via email.76
In PCCare Inc., the court held that, for service by Facebook to be
the “only” means of service, there has to be substantial evidence “that
would give the [c]ourt a degree of certainty that the Facebook profile . . .
is in fact maintained by [the defendant] or that the email address listed on
the Facebook profile is operational and accessed by [the defendant].”77
Even though the FTC set forth enough facts to prove that it was likely the
Facebook accounts were actually operated by the foreign defendants
because the email addresses for the Facebook accounts matched the email
addresses given to the plaintiff, and the Facebook accounts “list[ed] their
job titles at the defendant companies as their professional activities,” the
court did not feel that Facebook alone was enough to be adequate notice.78
Due to the specific circumstances of this case, it was found to be a
constitutional method of service because it was highly likely to reach the
defendants by service of email and Facebook combined.79 If “defendants
run an online business, communicate with customers via email, and
advertise their business on their Facebook pages,” it complies with due
process of law to serve the defendant by those same means.80
71. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1015.
72. PCCare247 Inc., 2013 WL 841037, at *3.
73. Id. at *5.
74. Id. at *4.
75. Id. at *4-5 (citing Williams-Sonoma Inc. v. Friendfinder Inc., No. C 0606572 JSW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31299, 2007 WL 1140639, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17,
2007)).
76. Id. at *5.
77. Id. (citing Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80594, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at *6.
80. Id.; Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002).
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The courts were wading into the new uncharted waters of social
media service, but they were cautious by finding these methods
constitutional only when exercised as a backstop or “collectively.”81 Like
seen in WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, the court found that “four means of
service [collectively], two email and two social networking accounts
ostensibly belonging to defendant, comport[ed] with due process.”82 This
proves that courts knew that this new area of service was the most
reasonable way to reach the foreign defendant, but their uncertainty of
reaching the desired defendant with this particular method of service made
courts ask for more than what was required of other traditional methods.
For example, in a bankruptcy case in Georgia, social media service
significantly helped a trustee having difficulty serving a foreign defendant
that was moving from country to country.83 In Broadfoot v. Diaz, the
foreign defendant was evading service by moving around and refusing to
give the trustee any useful contact information.84 The only forms of
communication the foreign defendant provided the trustee with was a
“facsimile number and [an] electronic mail address, [which] indicated his
preference for such methods of communication.”85 With the help of Rule
4(f)(3) that gives courts the flexibility to authorize special means of
service in particularly difficult cases, it was found constitutional to allow
service via electronic email and fax, in addition to service by mail to the
defendant’s last known address, because that was proven to be the foreign
defendant’s preferred means of communication.86 This is an example of
courts protecting themselves from the fear of breaching a defendant’s due
process rights through authorized progressive means of service, such as
email and fax, by allowing them collectively with a more traditional
means of service. However, over time, courts have developed the
principle that “[I]f any methods of communication can be reasonably
calculated to provide a [foreign] defendant with real notice, surely those
communication channels utilized and preferred by the defendant himself
must be included among them.”87
Even though courts were being cautious by requiring more when
serving foreign defendants via social media to ensure constitutionality,
situations eventually arose where social media service alone was enough
81. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22084, at *11 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014).
82. Id. at *11-12.
83. Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs.), 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2000).
84. Id. at 718.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 720.
87. Id. at 721.
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because it was the only available means. For example, in St. Francis
Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, the plaintiff sued the defendant for relief and
damages that were a result of the defendant’s financing a terrorist
organization.88
The plaintiff struggled to locate and serve the
international defendant, so the plaintiff requested the court to authorize
service of process through the defendant’s Twitter account that had been
used “to fundraise large sums of money for terrorist organizations.”89
Because of the defendant’s active use of the Twitter account to
communicate with other individuals, the court found this method alone to
be proper because under these specific circumstances “service by the
social-media platform, Twitter, was reasonably calculated to give notice”
and was the “method of service most likely to reach” the defendant.90
Similarly, in Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, the court
authorized service via email under Rule 4(f)(3) because the foreign
defendant, an internet business entity, had “designated its e-mail address
as its preferred contact information.”91 Unlike New England Merchs. Nat’l
Bank, the foreign defendant in Rio Props., Inc. was an internet business
entity that had neither an office nor a door- just a computer terminal.92
The court found that if any method of communication was to be
reasonably calculated to provide the foreign defendant with notice, then it
must have been email, considering it was the method of communication
the defendant utilized and preferred.93 With the defendant’s business
being structured so that email was the only way to contact the defendant,
the court was forced to adapt to the circumstances of the case and allow
sole service via email to be constitutional.94 These are proper
circumstances for the court to broaden the methods allowed under the
constitutional principle and progress into the technological renaissance.95
Different jurisdictions have authorized different methods of
electronic and online service of process pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) because
each court had to decide based on the circumstance of the case which
method would most likely reach the defendant with notice, such as what
particular form of social media was used by the defendant.96 Even though
88. St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait Fin. House, No. 3:16-cv-3240-LB, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 136152 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2016).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
92. Id. at 1018.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d 1007.
96. See, e.g., FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31969, 2013 WL
841037, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 7, 2013) (permitting service by email and Facebook); In
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service of process through social media started internationally, this
method of service has progressed to be used not only on foreign
defendants but also on domestic defendants under certain circumstances in
jurisdictions that have evolved with advances in technology.
E. Service of Process Through Social Media in the United States
Over the past decade, social media has become a prominent part of
many people’s lives to the extent that some jurisdictions are permitting
service through social media as an alternative form of service on nonforeign defendants.97 There is no provision authorizing social media
service on domestic individuals under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; however, it has been allowed by federal courts relying on state
law under Rule 4(e).98 Federal courts have found a loophole to not only
serve defendants by social media service on foreign defendants under
Rule 4(f)(3) but also on domestic defendants by relying on service rules of
a state under Rule 4(e)(1).99
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(e) is the rule for “serving an individual
within a judicial district of the United States,” which allows service by (1)
following state service rules of the state where the federal lawsuit is
pending or where the defendant is served, (2) personal service, (3)
dwelling and usual place of abode service, or (4) delivering service to an
authorized agent.100 Under Rule 4(e)(1), the federal courts are further
unshackled from being limited to the traditional methods of service of
process. More specifically, Rule 4(e)(1) allows an individual that is
competent and not a minor to be “served in a judicial district of the United
States by following state law for serving a summons in an action brought
in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district is located or
where service is made.”101 This rule gives federal courts a window to
authorize social media service when a state’s service rules permit it
through a broad notice provision.

re Int’l Telemedia Associates, Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000)
(authorizing service on defendant by fax and email address); Rio Properties, Inc., 284
F.3d at 1016 (permitting service by email); Chanel, Inc. v. acheterchanel.com, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115518, 2012 WL 3544844 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2012) (authorizing service
of process by email).
97. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
98. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 80594, 2012 WL 2086950 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e).
101. Id.
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For example, in Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, the case was filed
in federal court in the Southern District of New York, which pursuant to
Rule 4(e), permitted the court to look to the service of process laws of
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308.102 Due to the domestic third-party defendant evading
service, the third-party plaintiff, Chase Bank, requested the court to allow
an alternative form of service via email and Facebook.103 Under N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 308, service can be made by (1) personal service, (2) delivery to
“a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business,
dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served” and
mail, (3) service on an agent, or (4) so-called “nail and mail” service.104
However, New York has a unique notice provision that allows service to
be made “in such manner as the court, upon motion without notice,
directs” when the more traditional methods are impracticable.105 Unlike
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(f), this special New York provision “requires a
showing of impracticability of other means of service” under the
circumstances of the case.106
In Fortunato, the facts of the case proved that all other means of
service were impracticable because the domestic defendant was evading
service. However, the court did not allow service via email or Facebook
because the plaintiff had “not set forth any facts that would give the
[c]ourt a degree of certainty” that the Facebook account or the email
address listed on the Facebook account was operated and accessed by the
domestic defendant.107 The court then settled to authorize the only
alternative method remaining, which was service by publication in the
area that the domestic defendant claimed to live on the Facebook
account.108 Social media service was allowed in this jurisdiction, but for
this particular case, it was not found constitutional because the plaintiff
did not set forth enough facts to prove the domestic defendant controlled
the email address or Facebook account.109 This is not always the case.110
In Ferrarese v. Shaw, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York authorized service via email and Facebook
as supplement means under Rule 4(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and McKinney’s CPLR (“CPLR”) Section 308(5) in New

102. Fortunato, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80594, at *3.
103. Id.
104. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Fortunato, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80594, at *7.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2015).

326

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 38:3

York.111 The plaintiff showed the other traditional means of service to be
impracticable through numerous failed attempts to serve the defendant at
her home address with a process server.112 The plaintiff even hired a
private investigator to locate the defendant, but these efforts still failed
due to the defendant continuously changing her name to evade service.
Because the other means were impracticable and the defendant was
evading service, the court authorized service via email and Facebook.113
But the court held that the plaintiff did not put forth enough facts to prove
the defendant actually controlled the email address and Facebook account,
so the court allowed these alternative methods as “supplemental means”114
to the valid method of service by certified mail with return receipt to the
defendant’s last known address.115 Courts want to allow social media
service, but they have not adapted to the advances in technology enough
to let the progressive method of service stand-alone unless the particular
situation of the case leaves the court no choice.
The federal courts have not been “blind to changes and advances
in technology.”116 The federal courts have adapted and evolved to accept
social media service under circumstances that call for it. Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no specific provision that
authorizes social media service, but there are provisions that indirectly
allow it on foreign and domestic defendants. Federal courts can only
authorize social media service on domestic defendants because some state
laws have evolved to contain a catch-all provision that indirectly allows
the courts to authorize it. Other states are keeping with the times and
taking advantage of the advancements in communication through
technology, particularly New York.
In New York, the provision of the statute that allowed the court to
authorize social media service was CPLR 308 (5), which permitted
personal service upon a natural person be made “in such manner as the
court … directs” if service is impracticable by in-hand personal service,
service by dwelling or usual place of abode, and nail and mail service
authorized by the statute.117 This provision gives the court the power to
look at the specific circumstances of the case in question and decide

111. Ferrarese v. Shaw, 164 F. Supp. 3d 361, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 715.
115. Ferrarese, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 364, 368.
116. Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002); Baidoo, 5
N.Y.S.3d at 711.
117. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016).

2020]

SERVICE OF PROCESS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA

327

whether service via email, Twitter, Facebook, fax, etc., would be much
more likely to reach the defendant than service by publication.118
For example, in Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, the plaintiff wife wanted
to serve her husband divorce papers through Facebook direct message
because she did not know the contact information nor the whereabouts of
the defendant to serve him properly through any other method of
service.119 This is one of those cases that leaves the court no choice but to
allow social media service, unaccompanied by traditional means, to be a
valid method of service because no other means is possible. The plaintiff
easily demonstrated the alternative means to be impracticable because all
three forms of service require knowledge of the defendant whereabouts.120
The defendant refused to make himself available for service as well as
failed to provide a fixed address or place of employment.121 Once the
plaintiff demonstrated that the other alternative means were impracticable,
the plaintiff had to set forth evidence that the defendant was the Facebook
account holder to satisfy constitutional principles.122
To silence the central concern of whether the method by which
the plaintiff seeks to serve a defendant comports with the fundamentals of
due process by being reasonably calculated to provide the defendant with
notice of the divorce, the plaintiff was required to submit a supplemental
affidavit to prove the Facebook account belonged to the defendant.123 The
court found the copies of communication exchanged between the plaintiff
and defendant over Facebook messages, along with verification of the
defendant’s photos, to be enough to persuade the court that the account
belonged to the defendant.124 After meeting the burden of demonstrating
that it would be impracticable to serve the defendant by any of the other
more traditional means of service and that service by Facebook was
constitutional, the court “ventured into uncharted waters” and authorized
service via Facebook direct message alone.125
Similarly, in Hollow v. Hollow, the plaintiff wife was attempting
to serve her husband, who had moved to Saudi Arabia via email pursuant
to the same expansive notice provision offered in the New York CPLR
308(5).126 A defendant moving to a foreign country does not “relieve a
118. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (citing Dime
Sav. Bank of N.Y. v. Mancini, 169 A.D.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
119. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 712.
120. Id. at 712.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 714.
123. Id. at 715.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 712-13.
126. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
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plaintiff of her obligation to make a reasonable effort to effectuate service
in a customary manner before seeking relief” under N.Y. CPLR 308(5).127
The plaintiff made reasonable efforts to effectuate service both through
Interserve, which is an international process server, and through the
defendant’s employer.128 With the other alternative methods proving to be
impracticable, the plaintiff proposed service via e-mail considering this
was the only form of communication the defendant used to communicate
with the plaintiff and his children.129
Because the “Constitution does not require any particular means of
service of process,”130 e-mail in this particular case complied with due
process because it was reasonably calculated to provide notice since email was the defendant’s preferred method of communication. To settle
the court’s concerns about the difficulty of verifying the defendant’s
receipt of the e-mail, it authorized service via e-mail, along with service
by international registered air mail and international mail standard, to
satisfy the due process requirements.131 Courts are not replacing any
traditional methods of service with social media service; courts are simply
adding this progressive method to increase the likelihood of reaching
defendants in difficult cases.
Parallel to the catch-all provision provided in the New York
statute, New Jersey has a similar provision, N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:44(b)(3), that authorizes social media service.132 This New Jersey service
rule states, “[A]s a tertiary and last resort, if service cannot be made by
any of the modes provided by R. 4:4-4, any defendant may be served as
provided by court order, consistent with due process of law.”133 In K.A. v.
J.L., the plaintiff requested to serve the defendant via Facebook
messenger under this New Jersey service rule.134 The defendant initially
contacted the plaintiff through Facebook and the plaintiff’s adopted son
through Instagram.135 Because the diligent efforts to serve the defendant
with injunction were exhausted through unsuccessful personal service and
publication, the court found social media service by Facebook account to

127. Id. at 706.
128. Id. at 707.
129. Id. at 705.
130. Id. at 707 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950)).
131. Id. at 708 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314).
132. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3).
133. K.A. v. J.L., 161 A.3d 154, 157 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016) (citing N.J. Ct. R.
4:4-4(b)(3)).
134. Id. at 156.
135. Id.
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be sufficient notice.136 The court did not require as much evidence proving
the authenticity of the Facebook account because it was the exact account
the defendant employed to contact the adopted son and gave rise to the
action for an injunction.137 In difficult cases where contact with the
defendant is minimal or primarily through social media, courts need to
have the freedom to authorize service that would more than likely reach
the defendant to give the plaintiff relief through constitutional means.
F. Methods of Service of Process Used in Mississippi Under Rule 4
Now that social media service has been shown to be constitutional
under certain circumstances, this Article proposes that Mississippi Rules
of Civil Procedure Rule 4 should be amended to include a provision that
would authorize it. Similar to the McKinney’s CPLR 308(5) provision,
the proposed amendment will be a catch-all provision that allows
plaintiffs to request a method of service, such as social media service,
when the more traditional methods are impracticable. If Mississippi
amends Rule 4, this would help ease the difficulty of serving defendants
who cannot not be located or who are evading service by the traditional
means offered under Rule 4.
The statutory provisions of Mississippi authorize many of the
same traditional methods of service that have been discussed for
individual defendants.138 Mississippi courts authorize the following
methods of service of process: (1) in-hand service of process by a process
server or sheriff, (2) service at dwelling or usual place of abode, (3)
service by first-class mail, (4) service by publication, and (5) service by
certified mail on persons outside the state.139 The proposed amendment
would only allow plaintiffs to request social media service when in-hand
service, service at dwelling, and service by first-class or certified mail
were attempted or found to be impracticable. The circumstances of each
case dictate what method of service is practicable. The following sections
will address and compare the traditional methods of service offered under
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4 that would have to be proven
impracticable before the proposed catch-all provision would take effect.

136. Id. at 159.
137. Id.
138. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4.
139. Id.
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1. In-Hand Service
In-hand service within a jurisdiction is the “gold standard” method
of service of process because it is the form of notice that is adequate in all
types of proceedings, which has always been considered constitutional.140
In-hand service, also known as personal service, is considered actual
notice because someone actually hands over written notice of the lawsuit
to the defendant in person.141 Mississippi courts allow “delivering a copy
of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally or to an
agent authorized by appointment of by law to receive service of
process.”142 This method of service is the optimal way to deliver a
complaint because it is direct and less disputable that service of process
occurred.143 But, this method of service is not always the easiest to
execute because it requires that the plaintiff filing suit to have knowledge
of the defendant’s whereabouts.144 Even though in-hand service is
preferable, it is not required.145
In Mississippi courts, delivery of copies of the summons and
complaint must be made by a process server or the sheriff of the county in
which the defendant resides.146 The process server can be any person that
is 18 years or older and who is not a party in the lawsuit.147 For a service
to be made by a sheriff, the party seeking service has to make a written
request to the court to appoint a sheriff to serve the individual
personally.148 The language of Mississippi’s Rule 4 requires that personal
service cannot be made with reasonable diligence before moving on to
another method such as abode or dwelling service.149 Therefore, a plaintiff
has to show that reasonable efforts were made to serve the defendant via
personal service before resorting to service on a relative at the dwelling
place.150 If reasonable diligence is proven in the failed attempt to serve an
individual personally, then the process server or server appointed by the
140. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950);
Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
141. Jean Murray, Constructive and Actual Notice in Civil Lawsuit Differences,
THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS (May 8, 2019),
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/constructive-notice-and-actual-notice-in-civil-lawsuits398193.
142. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(A).
143. Murray, supra note 142.
144. GLANNON ET AL, supra note at 351.
145. In-hand Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
146. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(c).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(B).
150. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(A).
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court can move on to the next substitute method of service if
circumstances warrant it, such as dwelling and abode service.
2. Dwelling or Usual Place of Abode
In the event the address of the party the plaintiff desires to notify is
unknown, one form of traditional substitute service of process that is
acceptable in Mississippi is “leaving a copy of the complaint and
summons at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode” in the
hands of someone that is of “suitable age and discretion who resides
there.”151 This form of substitute service is a constructive form of notice
because the court presumes that the defendant will have knowledge of the
suit if the service is delivered to a resident at his dwelling.152
In Mississippi, there are two steps for the process server or sheriff
to successfully serve the defendant at their usual place of abode: (1)
“leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the defendant’s usual
place of abode with the defendant’s spouse or some other person of the
defendant’s family above the age of sixteen years who is willing to
receive service and (2) by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and
complaint” to that same residence by first class mail.153 The person who
serves the defendant is still a process server that is 18 years or older and
not a party or a sheriff appointed by the court upon the plaintiff’s
request.154 The detail in the statute that says spouse or other family
ensures that the court is focusing on the dwelling or abode to be
considered the defendant’s “home” or “residence.”
Because it is presumed that a resident of suitable age and
discretion will notify the interested person of the suit, “direct service upon
a person is not necessary when service is made at that person’s home with
another resident present.”155 Even though the particulars of age and other
small details may change from one jurisdiction to another, the general
“rule authorizing dwelling house service of process comports with due
process.” 156 If due diligence is exercised through repeated efforts to serve
a person that resides at the individual’s dwelling place and these efforts
fail, then another method of sending the papers to the individual’s
dwelling is acceptable, such as service by mail service.157
4. Service Via Mail
151. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(B).
152. Rentz v. Swift Transp. Co., 185 F.R.D. 693, 697 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
153. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(B).
154. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(c).
155. Farm Credit Bank v. Stedman, 449 N.W.2d 562, 564 (N.D. 1989).
156. Id. (citing 62 AM. JUR. 2D Process § 99 (1972)).
157. Estate of Waterman v. Jones, 46 A.D.3d 63, 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
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Mississippi courts allow service of process through registered mail
to the defendant’s postal address to be a sufficient form of notice.158 The
process server sending “notice by mail may reasonably be relied upon to
provide interested persons with actual notice of judicial proceedings”
which complies with due process of law.159
In Mississippi, service may be served upon a defendant by mail on
any class of “individual[s] other than an unmarried infant or a mentally
incompetent person” or “a domestic or foreign corporation.”160 These
classes of defendants can be served “by mailing a copy of the summons
and of the complaint (by first class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to
be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgement …
and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender.”161 In this
jurisdiction, “service by certified mail on a person outside” of Mississippi
is also an authorized method of service.162 The important aspect of service
by mail on both in state and out of state defendants is the fact that both
require some form of “certified” or “registered mail” to ensure that the
defendant was notified before any final judgments were rendered against
them.163
Different jurisdictions have different laws for substitute service, so
it is imperative to check the law of that jurisdiction before deciding what
method of service to employ.164 Some jurisdictions willingly allow this
method of service when other methods are ineffective because notice by
mail is “inexpensive and efficient.”165 Even though some jurisdictions
freely allow this method, other jurisdictions limit this method to only
allowing service via mail on out of state defendants.166 However, when
the address or location of a defendant is unknown or service by mail was
refused by the defendant, courts will likely resort to a more inefficient
means of service, service by publication.
5. Publication Service

158. Registered Mail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
159. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982); Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d
317, 321 (Miss. 1987) (noting that, “Without doubt, Rule 4(c), Miss.R.Civ.P., prescribes
in the alternative several constitutionally permissible methods of effecting service of
process . . . .”).
160. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Service of Process, MARKELL & ASSOCS., INC.,
https://www.markellegal.com/our-services/service-of-process/.
165. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982).
166. Cent. Insurers of Grenada, Inc. v. Greenwood, 268 So. 3d 493, 502 (Miss.
2018).
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Publication is a constructive form of notice that is usually a last
resort.
Publication service is “where the summons is printed in a
newspaper designated by the court and which can be granted upon
showing that ‘service cannot be made by another prescribed method with
due diligence.’”168 This form of service is constructive because the
defendant will be assumed to have knowledge of the proceedings because
it will be in public record.169
In Mississippi, if it is proven after diligent inquiry that the plaintiff
or petitioner does not know the postal address of the defendant, then the
clerk “shall promptly prepare and publish a summons to the defendant to
appear and defend the suit.”170 The service by publication will appear in
the newspaper of the county where the proceedings are pending once a
week for three successive weeks.171 In the event that the county does not
have a newspaper, then the notice will be attached to the courthouse door
of the county as well as be published in an adjoining county’s
newspaper.172 The court assumes this method to be effective whether the
defendant reads the notice or not because the information is publicly
displayed in the newspaper via publication.173
Although service by publication has been accepted as a
constitutionally permissible method of service,174 its constitutionality
should be questioned because there are now other methods of service that
are substantially more likely to give the defendant notice including social
media service. Because this method of service is very unlikely to be seen
and costly, some jurisdictions have begun to allow other methods of
service to be authorized by the court, such as social media service.175
All the traditional methods of service discussed above are methods
that are commonly used in other jurisdictions, so Mississippi should
follow other progressive jurisdictions by adding a catch-all provision.
Under Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no
progressive notice provision, as seen in the New York and New Jersey
statutory provisions, or case law that gives the court freedom to authorize
an alternative form of service, such as social media service, when the
traditional methods are impracticable.176 This is a provision that
167

167. MARKELL & ASSOCS., supra note 165.
168. GLANNON ET AL, supra note 23, at 351.
169. Murray, supra note 142.
170. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(4).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Publication, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
174. Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317, 321 (Miss. 1987).
175. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 810-813.
176. Id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016).
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Mississippi should consider amending Rule 4 to add because it would
increase the likelihood of defendants sufficiently receiving notice, which
is the key principle in determining the constitutionality of methods of
service.
III. MISSISSIPPI SHOULD ADOPT A SERVICE OF PROCESS RULE THAT WILL
ALLOW SERVICE VIA SOCIAL MEDIA
In 2017, 81 percent of the United States population had some form
of a social media account.177 The The increase in the population’s use of
social media and internet sources opens a whole new opportunity for more
efficient service of process. Service of process via social media was first
introduced under the flexible notice provision Rule 4(f)(3), which
authorizes service “by any means not prohibited by international
agreement, as the court orders.”178 Service of process via the internet and
social media is one of the most efficient ways to serve an individual in a
foreign country depending on the specific facts of the case, time, and
money. The language of the statute gives the court the power to allow any
means of service that it sees as constitutional and reasonable, including
social media service.179
A form of this catch-all provision giving courts the power to allow
“any means”180 was adopted in some states in the United States.181 For
example, both New York and New Jersey’s service rules contain a catchall provision for difficult cases that their traditional methods of service
authorized are impracticable.182 In the New York notice provision, CPLR
308 (5) authorizes personal service upon an individual to be made “in
such manner as the court, upon motion without notice, directs, if service is
impracticable under paragraphs one [in-hand service], two [service to
177. Clement, supra note 6.
178. MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
179. See, e.g., FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7189, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31969, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 7, 2013) (permitting service by email and
Facebook); Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs.), 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2000) (authorizing service on defendant by fax and email address); Rio Properties,
Inc., 284 F.3d at 1016 (permitting service by email); Chanel, Inc. v. acheterchanel.com,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115518, 2012 WL 3544844 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2012)
(authorizing service of process by email).
180. See, e.g., PCCare247 Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31969, at *3-4
(permitting service by email and Facebook); Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 720 (authorizing
service on defendant by fax and email address); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016 (permitting
service by email); Chanel, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115518 (authorizing service of
process by email).
181. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016).
182. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016).

2020]

SERVICE OF PROCESS THROUGH SOCIAL MEDIA

335

dwelling or usual place of abode] and four [nail and mail service] of
[CPLR 308] section.”183 This provision gives courts the power to accept
any means of service that they find appropriate under the circumstances of
the case, including service via social media.
Giving courts this freedom leads to a more efficient way to
increase the chance that a defendant will actually receive notice. With the
whole purpose behind service of process being to give the defendant
adequate notice, Mississippi should follow this trend and expand the rules
of service of process to give courts the power to include service through
social media for the purpose of increasing the likelihood that a defendant
actually receives notice.
A. Proposed Amendment to Mississippi Service of Process Rule
The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure were first adopted
effective January 1, 1982, which included Rule 4 regarding process and
was later amended again in 1982 and 1984.184 Amendments are “the
process of altering or amending a law or document.”185 These alterations
are made to improve an existing law when circumstances arise that were
not thought of when the law was originally formed. Amendments to the
law ensure its ability to remain relevant and flexible to the issues at hand.
In order for the courts to be modernized, the Mississippi Supreme Court
should request the Mississippi Rules Advisory Committee draft an
amendment similar to McKinney’s CPLR 308(5) that is specifically
tailored to Mississippi’s Rule 4.
Courts across the country are “adapting with the times” and taking
steps to maximize the effectiveness of notice through the use of social
media.186 If other courts and states are evolving, then Mississippi should
do so also in order to give parties in a lawsuit the advantage offered by
other courts. The times are changing with the advancements in
communication through social media. Seven out of ten adults in American
use at least one form of an internet social networking service with

183. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
184. Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317, 319 (Miss. 1987).
185. Amendment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015).
186. Wade v. Furmanite Am., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00169, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75624, at *23 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2018) (quoting Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., No. 14–
CV–03074–CMA–CBS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205079, at *6 (D. Colo. Apr. 28, 2017)
(“The Court agrees that electronic notice through social media platforms is particularly
appropriate for classes comprised of largely young, largely transient unnamed plaintiffs,
because email addresses and physical addresses may not provide a reliable, durable form
of contact.”)).
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Facebook being the most popular.187 The recognition of this vastly used
method of communication should signal the court’s attention and compel
them to take advantage of it.
The proposed amendment to Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 4 should be a catch-all provision for specific situations that give the
court the power to determine what means of service would be the most
effective in actually providing the defendant notice of the suit. The desired
amendment would add a provision similar to that provided in New York
under CPLR 308 (5) which authorizes effective notice “in such manner
that the court directs, if service is impracticable under the traditional
methods of service listed in the statute,”188 which gives the court the
inherent power to decide what is the more potent or appropriate process
under the circumstances.189 This provision is to give the court authority to
allow other means of service when it is impractical to use other alternative
methods. The proposed provision is a catch-all because it is the back-up
plan for very specific circumstances that an alternative form of service,
such as service via social media, is more likely to reach the defendant than
traditional means.
The language of the proposed amendment will be crafted from a
combination of the flexible notice provisions provided in the New Jersey
and New York service rules.190 The provision would add to the current
rule as follows: “(6) by court order. If service is impracticable under
sections (c) then: (1) by process server pursuant to section (d), (2) by
sheriff pursuant to section (d), (3) by mail, or (6) service by certified mail
on person outside state, then any defendant may be served as provided by
court order, consistent with due process of law.” This provision is
proposed to be placed last under section (c) as the catch-all provision.
However, service by publication is not included in the list of methods that
have to be proved impracticable because the futile means of service by
publication should be the last resort when no other means, such as social
media service, are available.
With the United States having a high percentage of people on
social media, it is likely that an appropriate way to serve a defendant
would be social media over publication.191 The language of “served as
provided by court order” in the proposed provision opens the doors to give
Mississippi courts the power to authorize service through social media if
the court determines under the circumstances that it is a more effective
187. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
188. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 711.
189. Bloodgood v. Leatherwood, 25 So. 3d 1047, 1050 (Miss. 2010).
190. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(5) (McKinney 2016).
191. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
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means to actually give notice. The “court is vested with the inherent
power to promulgate procedural rules” under certain circumstances when
dealing with a particular class of missing or service evading defendants.192
This amendment would be to give freedom to the court to decide whether
to approve a motion for service by social media only after due diligence
has been proved.193
This proposed provision is not altering the traditional methods of
service offered under the Mississippi Rules of civil Procedure Rule 4. It is
simply giving courts another last resort method to choose from in order to
ensure justice for missing defendants under certain circumstances. Social
media service has already been proven constitutional, when the specific
facts of the case allow it, so now Mississippi courts need a provision that
authorizes this method of service. With social media service being
constitutional and the proposed amendment proven to work in other
jurisdictions, the Mississippi courts should incorporate this method into its
statute because Mississippi should adapt and evolve to benefit the
potential defendants who are desired to be reached.
B. Reasons Mississippi Should Adopt a More Flexible Provision to
Include Service of Process Through Social Media
If “the constitutional requirements of service of process are notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections,”194 then why should two forms of notice such as
mail and publication be allowed “[when] it will doubtless never be
seen?”195 Since notice, circumstances, and opportunity to be heard are the
sole focuses of the constitutional requirement of service of process, how
can one say that their efforts to give notice were made in good-faith196 and
reasonably calculated to provide notice if something is doubtful to be
seen? If a court has more options than the traditional methods of service
that would be more likely to reach the defendant under certain
circumstances, such as service via social media, then it should be given
192. Bloodgood, 25 So. 3d at 1050 (citing Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 76
(Miss. 1975)).
193. Goetz v. Synthesys Techs., Inc., 415 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2005).
194. K.A. v. J.L., 161 A.3d 154, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016) (citing Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (internal quotations
omitted)).
195. Noble v. Noble, 502 So. 2d 317, 322 (Miss. 1987).
196. Sanders v. Robertson, 954 So. 2d 493, 496 (Miss. App. 2007) (“Sanders
next argues that he made a good faith effort to serve Robertson but could not do so
because he could not locate her.”).
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the authority to make that determination and allow the method most likely
to give a potential defendant the opportunity to defend himself.
Even though “a probably futile means of notification is all that the
situation permits” to be considered constitutional notice when a person’s
location is unknown, the courts should still use the method that is most
likely to reach the defendant if one is available.197 For example, in the
United States Supreme Court, the court denied service by publication
because the defendant’s address was known making service by mail an
available method.198 In Schroeder v. City of New York, the court asserted
that if there was a better method of service available, then it should trump
the alternative.199 If service by mail trumps publication, then surely
service by e-mail should also. Service by publication is only
constitutionally acceptable “because it [i]s no more likely to fail to give
actual notice than any other method that the legislature could possibly
prescribe,” especially when dealing with missing defendants.200 This is no
longer the case with advances in technology because now there is social
media service that legislature could prescribe that would trump
publication.
If there are other means available that would more likely reach the
potential defendant than other traditional means, then that alternative
method, such as social media service, should be implemented in order to
comply with due process. “The determination of due process requires the
balancing of ‘the vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its
fiduciaries to a final settlement’ against ‘the individual interest sought to
be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”201 Amending the rules to
add another back-up plan that gives courts the freedom to approve
alternative methods of service based on the circumstances of the case will
only improve the defendant’s likelihood of receiving notice while
protecting the defendant’s right to be heard under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Addition of a flexible notice provision would protect a
defendant’s due process rights because the court would be allowing all
efforts to get notice to a defendant, which would result in a constitutional,
good faith effort.
Mississippi courts should never lose focus of the purpose of
notice, which is to give the defendant the opportunity to be heard, and
service of process is used to accomplish notice. With the main focus being
197. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
198. Greenbaum, supra note 31.
199. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213 (1962).
200. Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 782.
201. K.A. v. J.L., 161 A.3d 154, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016) (citing Mullane, 339
U.S. at 314-15).
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to give the defendant the opportunity to be heard, the court should have
the freedom to decide what method is most likely to accomplish this
standard goal. If means have to be that of attempting to actually inform
the defendant, then a court allowing service by publication rather than
another more pragmatic means, such as social media service, would not be
truly desirous of actually informing the defendant.202 One actually
desirous of informing the defendant would have chosen a different method
to increase the likelihood of actually informing the defendant.
The court should be able to choose from all its possible resources,
not just the traditional, old fashioned methods, so an amendment is
necessary to expand the courts’ options. For example, if an individual has
a set of tools and none of the tools in their toolbox would effectively fix a
certain problem, they could use duck tap (publication) even though this
quick fix is not the most efficient method. If there was a tool that had
evolved and would help accomplish the simple goal of giving notice to a
missing defendant, then why would the individual not add the tool to their
toolbox. Similarly, Mississippi should amend Rule 4 to add a broad notice
provision, so courts have all the tools to ensure that a defendant gets a
sufficient, good-faith effort in attempting to notify them of the
proceedings.
Aside from being more constitutional by choosing the most
adequate method from all possible resources, another benefit social media
has to offer includes “relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for
communications of all kind.”203 Courts should utilize this benefit. One of
the most common complaints with any interaction with the judicial system
is the expenses that come alongside it. As shown in Joe Hand Promotions,
Inc. v. Shepard, the plaintiff complained that he ‘“exhausted all of
standard means by which [he] [could] serve the defendants . . . and [has]
incurred great expense in doing so.’”204
Publication and paying for postal services to serve a defendant can
become costly when it takes “multiple attempts” to serve someone in
order to show that the plaintiff did their due diligence in attempting to
notify the defendant.205 For example, in Mullane, notice by mail was
alleged to be more effective in getting notice to defendants than
publication because mail was recognized as an efficient and inexpensive
means of communication that did not put an unnecessary burden on

202. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
203. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
204. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Shepard, No. 4:12cv1728 SNLJ, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 113578, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2013).
205. Goetz v. Synthesys Techs., Inc., 415 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2005).
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plaintiffs.206 With social media being an even more efficient and
inexpensive means of communication than mail, surely it should be more
effective than publication. If there is another method available that is
speedier, less costly, and possibly more effective in providing the
defendant with notice, then the court should take this method into account
when determining what method is reasonably calculated to give notice.
Another reason Mississippi should amend Rule 4 is that, if courts
are allowing social media into courts as evidence and e-signatures to form
contracts, then why not evolve to allow service of process through social
media as well. If a “[c]ourt concludes [a plaintiff] may employ its
proposed electronic signature method for execution of consent forms,”
then why vary from this general practice of allowing electronic and
internet-based methods, evidence, and contracts into court.207 If
Mississippi courts are willing to determine the outcome of a case based on
evidence from social media, as seen in Smith v. State, then a plaintiff
should be allowed to simply serve a defendant through the same means.208
With the times changing and social media becoming more present in
proceedings, it is time to amend Rule 4 to adapt and evolve for the benefit
of potential defendants as well as the efficiency to the judicial system.
Mississippi not adopting a more flexible provision that would give
courts the power to authorize service of process through social media only
puts defendants at a disadvantage. If all we care about is giving adequate
notice to defendants so that they have the opportunity to be heard, then
Mississippi should include service of process though social media to
increase the chances of defendants actually receiving notice.209
Mississippi needs to adapt to the advances in communication for the
benefit of potential defendants.
C. The Negatives of Service of Process Through Social Media
One major drawback courts consider regarding social media
service is the uncertainty that the person on the other end of the internet is
actually the person the plaintiff desires to serve. This central drawback is
the main reason social media service has been held to be unconstitutional
in some cases. As seen in Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, the court’s
206. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
207. Wade v. Furmanite Am., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00169, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75624, at *24 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2018) (citing Dyson v. Stuart Petroleum Testers, Inc.,
308 F.R.D. 510, 518 (W.D. Tex. 2015)); Aguirre v. Tastee Kreme #2, Inc., No. CV H–
16–2611, 2017 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 83327, at *8 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 2017).
208. Smith v. State, 136 So. 3d 424 (Miss. 2014).
209. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914)).
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concern that “anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or
incomplete information” prevented the court from being able to confirm
the authenticity of the defendant’s social media account.210
It is true that people commonly steal other individuals’ identities
over the internet, and plaintiffs can never be 100 percent sure that they are
actually communicating with the defendant they desire to give notice to.
The inability to confirm the authenticity of the account marks the method
of service unconstitutional because the court cannot reasonably find that
notice will reach the defendant when they do not reasonably trust that the
account belongs to the desired defendant. However, in some cases,
plaintiffs have set forth enough facts that provided courts with a degree of
certainty in regard to the authenticity of the social media account,
rendering it a constitutional method. Even though the “concerns over
authentication arise because anyone can create a fictitious account and
masquerade under another person’s name or can gain access to another’s
account,”211 there are ways to check Internet Protocol addresses212 as well
as checking the activity on the social media accounts to make sure it is the
person that the plaintiff actually desires to reach.
Mississippi has a standard to prove the authenticity of Facebook
messages to permit them to be entered into evidence. In Mississippi, such
evidence is sufficiently authenticated when:
“. . . the sender admits authorship, the purported sender is
seen composing the communication, business records of an
internet service provider or cell phone company show that
the communication originated from the purported sender’s
personal computer or cell phone under circumstances in
which it is reasonable to believe that only the purported
sender would have access to the computer or cell phone,
the communication contains information that only the
purported sender could be expected to know, the purported
sender responds to an exchange in such a way as to
indicate circumstantially that he was in fact the author of
the communication, or other circumstances peculiar to the

210. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 Civ. 6608 (JFK), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 80594, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (citing Smith v.
State, 136 So. 3d 424 (Miss. 2014)).
211. Smith, 136 So. 3d at 432.
212. IP Address, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/definition/ip_address (An
Internet Protocol address, “or simply an ‘IP,’ is a unique address that identifies a device
on the Internet or a local network.”).
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particular case may suffice to establish a prima facie
showing of authenticity.”213
This rule was provided in Smith where the defendant argued that the court
erred in admitting several Facebook messages into evidence because it
was not proven that the defendant controlled the Facebook account.214
Even though there was not enough evidence set forth in this particular
case, there are cases that have, and will, set forth evidence substantial
enough to prove the authentication of the defendant’s ownership of the
account.215 For example, enough set of facts were set forth in Baidoo216
and K.A. v. J.L.217 that would have met the requirements set out in
Mississippi’s authenticity rule.
The standard provided in Smith, proves that Mississippi is
accepting of social media evidence when there is enough evidence to
prove the defendant is the true owner of the social media account.218
The same requirements to prove authenticity for social media evidence
can be used to prove the identity of a defendant for social media service.
If courts are willing to determine the outcome of cases with the high risk
of finality based on social media evidence, then courts should allow social
media service to simply kick the lawsuit off.
Though there will always be some uncertainty, the uncertainty of
not reaching the desired person via social media is similar to the
uncertainty of service by publication. With service of process by
publication, the uncertainty of actually getting a defendant notice is just as
great, if not greater. The uncertainty of not reaching the desired person is
an issue that is present in all alternative methods that are not personal
service. This uncertainty is not enough to not allow service via social
media.
Another drawback for many courts, as well as Mississippi courts,
is that allowing social media service is asking courts to “venture into

213. Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714 (Sup. Ct. 2015).The court
found the copies of communication exchanged between the plaintiff and defendant over
Facebook messages, along with verification of the defendant’s photos, to be enough to
persuade the court that the account belonged to the defendant.
217. K.A. v. J.L., 161 A.3d 154, 159 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016). The court did not
require as much evidence proving the authenticity of the Facebook account because it
was the exact account the defendant employed to contact the adopted son and gave rise to
the action for an injunction.
218. Smith, 136 So. 3d at 433.
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uncharted waters without the guiding light of clear judicial precedent.”219
Many jurisdictions are uneasy about stepping out of their comfort zones
and permitting nontraditional methods of service. However, the State of
New York has always been a trendsetter, and New York’s acceptance of a
flexible provision that permits social media service is a trend that all
jurisdictions, including Mississippi, should follow. Just because there is
no judicial precedent guiding the decisions to allow social media service
does not mean it is wrong. If everything new or different was considered
to be wrong, then the courts would never grow and evolve to benefit the
efficiency of the judicial system.
D. The Expansion to Include Service Through Social Media Carries More
Positive Weight Than Negative
The benefits of social media service to defendants outweighs the
potential drawbacks. The main focus of service of process is to give
defendants notice of an action, so they can defend themselves. Service of
process through social media can be more effective than other means of
service in certain situations, so courts should be given the freedom to
choose means that are more effective, such as service via social media.
The circumstances and facts of each case trigger what method of
service is practicable for that particular situation. For example, if the
circumstances show that the defendant desired to be notified can be
located or the address of the defendant is known, then service in-hand, by
dwelling or usual place of abode, or by mail are all permitted.220 However,
when the circumstances include a defendant that is a nonresident of the
state, cannot be found after diligent inquiry, or whose post office address
is unknown after diligent inquiry, then the circumstances would permit
service by publication.221 If the circumstances show that the defendant is
located outside of Mississippi, then the plaintiff can choose service by
certified mail for convenience, rather than taxing themselves with other
more invasive methods.222 The circumstances of the case are the basis for
what makes the court find a method of service sufficient. Advances in
technology have created circumstances that would make social media
service the more pragmatic method, such as situations where the
defendant is evading service, cannot be located, or the lawsuit was
initiated over the internet or social media. Because of advances in
communication creating circumstances that make social media service the
219. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 713.
220. MISS. R. CIV. P. RULE 4(c)(1-3).
221. MISS. R. CIV. P. RULE 4(c)(4).
222. MISS. R. CIV. P. RULE 4(c)(5).
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more efficient method, the Mississippi Supreme Court should adapt and
request an amendment to add a more flexible provision to authorize social
media service to give relief to these specific situations.
Service via social media is more efficient because plaintiffs do not
have to waste time and money searching for a defendant, paying a process
server to make multiple trips to a residence, or paying for publication that
is costly. The efficiency of being able to find defendants faster on the
internet and social media is a benefit that would make service of process
more efficient and less costly. These benefits outweigh potential
uncertainty that one might have with regards to the right person being the
true social media account holder.
VI. CONCLUSION
For notice to be constitutionally sufficient, the method of service
must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appraise
interested parties of the pendency of the action.”223 With emphasis on
“reasonably calculated,” it is questionable how courts consider service of
process though publication or certified mail when a defendant’s location is
unknown to be “reasonably calculated” when there is a whole other
universe of communication being underutilized. The times have changed
with eight out of ten people on Facebook and 81% on some form of social
media. The technological advances have opened up a new set of cheaper
and faster sources of communication, and courts should take advantage of
this.
All the traditional methods of service authorized under
Mississippi’s Rule 4 are traditional because they are commonly authorized
in other jurisdictions, so if other jurisdictions are expanding their methods
of service, then Mississippi courts should follow to evolve and be more
efficient. The Mississippi Supreme Court should follow other progressive
jurisdictions, such as New York and New Jersey, by adding a flexible
notice provision to Rule 4. Mississippi should adopt this flexible notice
provision to give its courts the power to allow service of process through
social media under certain circumstances, so a court may fairly determine
what is reasonably calculated from all the available resources.
Conforming to the use of technology and social media as an alternative
method of service will only improve the likelihood that the defendant
receives notice and, therefore, better comply with the constitutional
requirements of notice.

223. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982).
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